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1. Introduction  
The process of globalisation of goods and services markets and improvements in the 
technology of communication has been accompanied by a deepening in international 
specialisation and a tendency towards a vertical fragmentation of production across 
national borders. As a result, the ‘make-or-buy’ internalisation choice of firms (i.e. 
whether to produce an intermediate in-house or outsource it to an upstream supplier) is 
increasingly international in nature – as outsourcing is directed towards suppliers 
located abroad.  In this context, the role of labour markets in influencing the mode-of-
operation decision of firms has attracted increasing attention in public and policy 
debates. The conventional wisdom that appears to emerge from these debates suggests 
that international outsourcing may be used by firms as a way to ‘escape’ distorted 
domestic labour markets. Specifically, given the still significant role played by 
unionisation in many industrialised economies, it has been suggested that outsourcing is 
a means to weaken trade unions and that strong unions make outsourcing more 
attractive.1  This view reflects the widespread notion that outsourcing is almost 
exclusively driven by the desire to reduce costs.2  Indeed, cost reductions are the 
dominant arguments used by firms to justify their outsourcing decision.3  However, a 
number of stylised facts are not consistent with this perspective.  On the one hand, the 
evidence on outsourcing leading to a reduction in costs and/or to improvements in the 
quality of intermediates is not conclusive.4 On the other hand, outsourcing does not 
appear to be more prevalent in countries with higher union coverage rates (see, e.g., 
Lommerud et al, 2009).  
 In this paper we argue that to gain a fuller understanding of the trade-offs involved 
in the mode-of-operation decision of firms requires broadening the focus of the analysis 
                                                 
1 For instance, machinist union leaders at Boeing see the company’s refusal to allow them to bid for work 
against outside contractors as evidence that Boeing’s outsourcing policy is not aimed at improving 
efficiency, but rather at weakening the union (Seattle Times, 10th Sept 2008). 
2 The common perception that the dominant motive for outsourcing is to reduce costs is exemplified by 
current predictions of an increase in outsourcing in response to the recession, as firms’ incentives to cut 
costs increase in a downturn (e.g. Outsourcers Outperform, the Economist, July 2, 2009).    
3 The reduction of operating costs is the top (out of 10) reason for outsourcing in the Outsourcing 
Institute’s annual survey of outsourcing current and potential end users 
(http://www.outsourcing.com/content.asp?page=01b/articles/intelligence/oi_top_ten_survey.html).  
4 For example, a study by management consultant Gartner and a survey by Direct Response, a provider of 
outsourced services, revealed that outsourced services may not results in any costs savings compared to 
services provided in-house, e.g. because of low quality and diluted brand values.  Evidence that 
outsourcing of services may be negatively correlated with profits or productivity is also provided in some 
econometric analyses of firm level data; see, for example, Görg and Hanley (2004) for the electronics 
firms in Ireland, and Görzig and Stephan (2002) for manufacturing companies in Germany.  
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beyond cost considerations to encompass the strategic interaction between firms.  An 
influential strand of the theoretical literature on outsourcing builds on the transaction 
cost approach pioneered by Coase (1937) and Williamson (1975, 1985). The transaction 
cost perspective – based on the role of incomplete contracts and asset specificity – 
places emphasis on the economising dimension (e.g. Williamson, 1991) of the make-or-
buy decision of the firm, which is ultimately based on a total cost comparison of 
alternative organisational structures.  Building on Leahy and Montagna (2007, 2009a, 
2009b), we argue that – to the extent that firms have market power – strategising5 
considerations will interact with economising considerations in determining the mode-
of-operation choice of firms.6  These strategic considerations are also likely to interact 
with other institutional features of countries (such as for example labour market 
institutions) in affecting firms’ incentives to outsource.7   We develop an oligopoly 
model in which firms facing domestic unionised labour markets choose between vertical 
integration and outsourcing of part of the vertical production chain to suppliers located 
in non-unionised countries (possibly characterised by lower labour costs): final good 
production entails the use of a highly specialised firm-specific intermediate good that 
can either be produced in-house or outsourced. The intermediate input requires an 
investment in quality and customisation. The higher the investment, the more useful and 
valuable is this input to the final good firm in the sense that the latter will need to use 
fewer complementary inputs in the production of a unit of the good. The usefulness of 
the intermediate to the final good producer is thus endogenous. Under vertical 
integration, the investment in quality is done in-house, while under outsourcing it is 
made by the foreign supplier. Given that in this model the intermediate is not a generic 
                                                 
5 Williamson (1991) uses the term strategising to refer to behavioural responses of firms that possess 
market power.  
6 Williamson (1991) argues that “most firms lack market power of the kind that is routinely assumed by 
the strategizing [IO] literature”.  However, empirical evidence suggests that the firms that operate in 
internationally (via export, outsourcing and foreign direct investment) tend to be larger than firms that 
operate only domestically (e.g. Tomiura, 2007). Hence, it is plausible to conjecture that such firms will 
tend to have higher degrees of market power – and that their mode-of-operation decision will therefore be 
more affected by considerations of a strategic nature.   
7 Although the literature on the effects of labour market institutions on the outsourcing decision is still 
fairly limited, there are notable exceptions to which this paper is related. Lommerud et al (2009) analyse 
how the incentive to outsource is influenced by unionisation within a partial equilibrium monopolistically 
competitive framework. Skaksen (2004) studies the implications of the potential of international 
outsourcing on union wages within a general equilibrium framework in which the decision to outsource 
occurs after union-firm wage negotiations. Koskela and Schöb (2008) analyse the effects of labour market 
reforms on the decision to outsource of unionised firms. A related, earlier, literature studies the effects of 
unionisation on the decision to do FDI: e.g. Zhao (1995), Bughin and Vannini (1995), Leahy and 
Montagna (2000), Naylor and Santoni (2003). 
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input that can be purchased from a spot market, the supplier will have to make a 
relationship-specific investment (RSI) which, in the presence of incomplete investment 
contracts, gives rise to a hold-up problem.8  The downstream firm then bargains with the 
foreign supplier over the price of the intermediate.  The make-or-buy decision of the 
firm therefore entails a trade-off between the higher corporate governance costs of 
vertical integration (i.e. the additional costs of coordinating a large vertically integrated 
organisation)9 and the transaction costs associated with outsourcing (which involves 
entering a relationship with an upstream firm that is beset with problems of contractual 
incompleteness). Within this framework, we examine how the strategic interaction 
between firms and the relative strength of firms and unions determine unions’ response 
to outsourcing and the incentive to outsource.  Furthermore, we examine the effect of 
outsourcing on firms’ investment and productivity, and the effect of changes in trade 
costs on the mode-of-operation equilibria.   
  The early transaction cost literature (e.g. the aforementioned work of 
Williamson) did not formalise the role of market interaction between competitors as it 
focussed on the bilateral relationship between a single producer and a potential supplier.  
An important breakthrough occurred when Grossman and Helpman (2002) 
contextualised this relationship within a theoretical framework that allows for an 
endogenous emergence of outsourcing with general equilibrium effects.10  However, by 
relying on monopolistically competitive market structures that abstract from strategic 
interaction between firms, in these models the mode-of-operation choice of one firm 
does not affect that of its rivals. To examine the effects of strategic interaction between 
firms, an oligopoly setting is required. We are not the first to study outsourcing under 
oligopoly. In a two stage duopoly game, Nickerson and Vanden Bergh (1999) show 
how both governance costs and oligopolistic interaction can influence the organisation 
choice of firms.  In their model, however, the buyer-supplier relationship is not 
modelled and no hold-up problem emerges. In Shy and Stenbacka (2003), the price of 
the input arises from the imperfectly competitive nature of the upstream sector and, 
                                                 
8 Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990) formalise the emergence of a hold-up problem 
from ex-ante investment distortions in a context in which negotiating advantages arise from asset 
ownership. 
9 Governance costs, which can also be thought of as managerial incentive costs of integration, have been 
extensively discussed in the literature. See for instance McLaren (2000) and references therein.  
10 This was further developed by Grossman and Helpman (2003 and 2005), and by Antràs and Helpman 
(2004). In most of these papers, outsourcing emerges in the presence of matching and is found to be more 
attractive the ‘thicker’ is the market for suppliers. The market thickness effect is also studied by McLaren 
(2000).   
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unlike our paper, is not influenced either by the level of investment made by the 
supplier or by buyer-supplier bargaining. In Chen et al (2004), within a model in which 
the upstream supplier competes with the downstream firm in the final good market, a 
strategic motive for outsourcing arises from a collusive effect resulting in a increase in 
the price of both intermediates and final goods. In general, in the existing literature on 
outsourcing in oligopoly, to our knowledge, issues related to incomplete contracts and 
relationship specific investment are not taken into account and their role in determining 
the nature of the trade-offs facing firms when making their mode-of-operation decisions 
are therefore disregarded.  
 Our analysis makes a number of contributions to the literature. A key feature of 
our paper is that we bring strategic considerations into a transaction cost framework in 
which the relationship specific investment a supplier needs to make in the quality of the 
intermediate is explicitly modelled. This enables us to offer an explanation as to why 
outsourcing can lead to an increase in the downstream firm’s marginal cost of 
production – even when the foreign supplier has an underlying cost advantage in 
producing the intermediate.  In the presence of contract incompleteness, the relationship 
specific investment generates a hold-up problem – which translates in this model into an 
under-investment in the quality of the intermediate that will work towards an increase in 
the marginal production cost of the downstream firm.11 In addition, we show that 
upstream outsourcing paradoxically increases the aggressiveness of the domestic unions 
(which bid up the wage) in the downstream sector. The intuition is that the union knows 
that the wage it sets has a smaller effect on the labour demanded by the firm, as the 
impact of domestic wages on home marginal cost is relatively less important when the 
firm outsources part of its production abroad, because reliance on domestic labour is 
lower. Thus, while unions can capture part of the additional rents generated by the 
investment in quality (and hence under vertical integration reduce the incentive to 
invest), an attempt to escape from this problem by outsourcing may not lead to more 
investment (and hence to a lower marginal production cost).  In this paper, therefore, 
not only do we endogenise the firms’ mode-of-operation, but also (contrary to the 
existing oligopoly literature) the quality of the input which feeds back to the trade-off 
between outsourcing and vertical integration – by affecting marginal production costs.  
                                                 
11 As is standard in the literature, this contract incompleteness originates from the inability of third parties 
to verify the suitability of the inputs provided by the suppliers.  See Spencer (2005) and Helpman (2006) 
for overviews. 
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In addition, we show that the existence of strategic effects allows for the emergence of 
asymmetric mode-of-operation equilibria, in which the firms choose different 
organisational forms even when they are ex-ante identical; this is in sharp contrast to the 
results obtained in the monopolistically competitive framework à la Grossman and 
Helpman in which asymmetric equilibria only arise in the presence of ex-ante efficiency 
differences. Consistent with Leahy and Montagna (2007, 2009a), we show that 
outsourcing – by softening the investment behaviour of rivals – can be viewed as a 
defensive business strategy that can be the best response to rivals’ choice of vertical 
integration.       
  The plan of the remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 sets out the model. 
The game is solved in Section 3 and the equilibrium regimes are discussed in Section 4. 
Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2.  The Model 
We consider an industry in which there are two final goods firms that sell a 
homogenous good to an integrated market.  This may be the home market of one or both 
of the firms or a third market. To economise on notation, we further assume that sales to 
the final good market do not involve a transport cost.12  The inverse demand is given by: 
 yap −= , (1)  
with 21 yyy += ,  where p is the price of the good, a is a constant parameter, and 1y  and 
2y  are the quantities produced by firms 1 and 2 respectively.  
The production of the final good requires a specialised component, which is 
combined in fixed proportions with labour.  One unit of this intermediate is required per 
unit of output. For firm i, let 0i il l z= − >  be the per-unit labour input requirement for 
the production of the final good, where l  is constant and iz  captures the ‘usefulness’ of 
the intermediate: a high iz  reflects a better intermediate, one that requires to be 
combined with fewer units of labour in order to produce a unit of output; thus, a good 
quality intermediate leads to a lower labour requirement per unit of output and hence to 
a higher labour productivity. The ‘usefulness’ of the intermediate to the final producer 
                                                 
12 It is easy to show that adding a transport cost in selling would not change the results of the paper 
qualitatively.  
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depends on the level of the investment (K) in its quality and customisation for the final 
good production. We assume that Kz = , i.e. there are diminishing returns to 
investment. This is a plausible assumption and one that is needed to ensure an interior 
solution.  We further assume that this investment does not require the use of labour.13  
The firm can either produce the intermediate in-house (vertical integration) or 
outsource it to a foreign supplier. If produced in-house, the specialized component can 
be obtained at a marginal cost of ˆi i ir w r= , where iw  is the wage paid by the firm and irˆ  
is the per-unit labour requirement in its production.  If it is outsourced to a foreign 
intermediate producer, the price of the intermediate input is iq .  To deliver this input to 
the home country where it is combined with labour, the outsourcing firm must pay a 
transport cost of t per unit of output.14   
Labour markets in the domestic economy are unionised with firm-specific 
unions bargaining with firms over the wage, while they are perfectly competitive in the 
foreign country. The foreign country’s wage is therefore exogenous and can be 
normalised at unity. 
Using the superscripts V and O to denote vertical integration and outsourcing 
respectively, marginal production cost for firm i will thus be:  
 )ˆ( iii
V
i zlrwc −+=  (2a)  
if the firm produces the intermediate in-house, and  
 ( )Oi i i i ic q w l z t= + − +   (2b) 
if the firm outsources its production to a foreign supplier. 
 If firm i is vertically integrated, its profit function is given by:  
 GKycp ii
V
i
V
i −−−= )(π , (3a) 
                                                 
13 It is common in the literature to assume that fixed and investment costs use different factor inputs from 
production. In an early example, Lawrence and Spiller (1983) distinguish between capital and labour and 
assume that they are exclusively used in fixed and variable costs respectively.  
14 Note that the results would not be materially changed were we to assume instead that it is the upstream 
firm that pays the transport cost.   
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where G represents the fixed governance cost15 that a vertically integrated firm is 
assumed to incur. On the other hand, if the firm chooses to outsource, its profit function 
will instead be: 
 i
O
i
O
i ycp )( −=π . (3b)  
When a firm chooses to outsource, it avoids both the investment costs and the 
governance cost of vertical integration. The investment costs are now borne by a foreign 
intermediate goods producer with whom the downstream firm has an outsourcing 
relationship and who has profits:  
 iii
m
iii EKmrq −−−= )(μ ,  (4) 
where mir  is  the intermediate producer’s marginal production cost – which can differ 
from ir , the marginal production cost of producing the intermediate in-house.  Output of 
the intermediate is given by im . Since one unit of the intermediate is needed in the 
production of each unit of final output, we can write ii ym = . The upstream firm must 
also incur a fixed entry cost iE . Note that in equation (4) and thereafter we use the 
subscript i to refer to an upstream-downstream pair (i.e. i represents the upstream firm 
that has a bilateral outsourcing relationship with downstream firm i).  
3.  The Game   
The model is a four-stage game.  In stage one, firms decide whether to produce their 
intermediate in-house at home or outsource it to a firm in a non-unionised foreign 
location.  If both firms outsource, then they each engage different foreign upstream 
firms to develop and supply the intermediate for them.  In stage two, the firms invest in 
the development of the intermediate.16 If they opt for vertical integration, firms 
undertake the investment in-house.  If they outsource, then the specialised supplier firm 
                                                 
15 G captures the costs – à la Williamson (1975, 1985) – of running a larger and more complex 
organisation. See also footnote 9 above. 
16 The relationship between upstream and downstream firms is a bilateral one. As discussed above, the 
intermediates are highly specific to a downstream firm and we assumed that each downstream firm 
chooses to outsource to a different upstream firm. We can rule out the possibility that more than one 
upstream firm compete to supply a downstream firm. One could think of there being ex ante many 
identical potential intermediate suppliers. However, only one firm will enter to supply a particular 
downstream firm in equilibrium since with more than one upstream firm, as a result of Bertrand 
competition, the intermediate price would be driven to the marginal production cost and the firms will be 
unable to cover their investment and fixed entry cost. Anticipating this, only one firm will enter to invest 
in and supply the firm-specific intermediate of any particular downstream firm.   
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undertakes the investment.  In stage three, the firms bargain with their firm-specific 
union over the wage and (if they outsource) they simultaneously bargain with the 
intermediate supplier over the price of the intermediate.  We assume that the final good 
producer only has enough time to negotiate with a single supplier.  As in Grossman and 
Helpman (2003), should bargaining breakdown, the producer will not have sufficient 
time to produce the intermediate itself, and so will exit the market – while the supplier 
will have wasted its investment.  In stage four, firms produce and sell the final output. 
 We derive the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium. As the game is solved by 
backward induction, we discuss the stages in reverse order starting with the final stage. 
3.1  Stage 4 
In the final stage of the game, the two firms engage in Cournot competition. Outputs are 
determined by maximising operating profits, defined as ( )h hi i ip c yπ = −  (where h=V,O), 
since at this stage all fixed and investment costs have been sunk. The first-order 
condition is given by: 
 0
h
hi
i i
i
p c y
y
π∂
= − − =
∂

, (5) 
where (h=V,O) and (i=1,2).  Combining the reaction functions implied by the first order 
condition in (5) with the inverse demand function in (1), we obtain the (final-stage) 
Nash equilibrium in quantities: 
 
3
2 kj
h
i
i
cca
y
+−
= ,                       (6) 
where  (h,k=V,O) and (i,j=1,2), with (i≠j).  
  
3.2  Stage 3 
In stage three of the game, firms will bargain over the wage with their firm-level unions. 
If they outsource, they will also simultaneously bargain with their supplier firm over the 
price of the intermediate.17  If the firm is vertically integrated, then all the labour used in 
                                                 
17 The purchase of intermediate components has sometimes been assumed to involve the combination of a 
fixed lump-sum payment and a price set at marginal cost.  As highlighted by Spencer (2005), however, 
the transfer of rents through lump-sum payments is at odds with stylised facts about domestic and 
international transactions.  Our paper recognizes that outsourcing contracts typically involve strictly 
positive prices that exceed marginal costs. The distribution of rents between intermediate supplier and 
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its production activities (assembly as well intermediate good production) is employed 
in-house. If it outsources, the firm’s labour demand will only be made up of the workers 
employed in the production of the final good.  
 Firm i’s firm-specific union’s utility function is given by:  
 hii
h
i LwwU )( −=                   (h=V,O, i=1,2), (7) 
where w  is  the reservation wage of the union and h hi i iL y ξ=  is the total employment of 
the downstream firm – where i
O
i zl −=ξ  and iiVi zlr −+= ˆξ  are the firm level per-unit 
employment in the two regimes.    The wage is determined via the maximisation of the 
following Nash bargain: 
       
1
( ) ( )h h h hi i i i iB w w L p c y
β β−⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= − −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦     (h=V,O, i=1,2),                                    (8) 
where [0,1]β ∈  is the bargaining power parameter. The larger is β, the greater is the 
bargaining power of the union.    Recalling that all fixed and investment costs are sunk 
at this stage, firms and unions take the firm level per unit employment hiξ  as given. 
Therefore, regardless of the mode-of-operation chosen by the firm, bargaining between 
a union-firm pair will result in a wage wi such that: 
 
2 /
i
i
i i
yw w
y w
β
β= − − ∂ ∂ . (9) 
From (2) and (6) we can obtain hiii wy ξ)3/2(/ −=∂∂ .  Combining this with (9) yields: 
 3
2 2
h i
i h
i
yw w β β ξ= + − .                                                                                       (10) 
Other things equal, and independently of the mode-of-operation of the firm, the wage 
increases in the bargaining power of the union. Also, as can be seen from /i iy w∂ ∂ , the 
greater is the per-unit input requirement of unionised labour hiξ , the greater is the 
(negative) impact on the firm’s output and operating profits of an increase in wage. The 
lower is hiξ and the larger is the output of the firm, the more the wage will increase in 
the bargaining power of the union.  Hence, unions will moderate their wage claims 
more the greater is the per-unit input requirement of unionised labour. Given that 
                                                                                                                                               
final good producer – and hence the return for relationship specific investment – is determined through 
Nash bargaining over the price after investment is sunk. 
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outsourcing reduces the latter, this result goes against conventional wisdom – which 
contends that outsourcing weakens the rent extraction ability of unions.  An explanation 
for this is that when the firm outsources, the union realises that increasing its wage has 
less of an impact on the labour demanded by the firm; this is because the effect of 
domestic wages on home marginal cost is relatively less important when the firm 
outsources part of its production abroad, since reliance on domestic labour is lower. As 
a result, the union becomes more aggressive in its wage setting and the per-unit rent for 
the workers still employed by the firm is higher (even though the total labour rent 
extracted from this firm may well be lower, since employment of unionised labour has 
declined). This result arises from a complementarity between foreign and domestic 
employment under outsourcing that is due to the complementarity between upstream 
and downstream activities.18 
 Now, substituting the wage equation in (10) into (2), the marginal costs can be 
written as: 
 3( )
2 2
O
i i i i ic q w l z y t
β
β= + − + +− , (11a) 
if the firm outsources its intermediate, and  
 3ˆ( )
2 2
V
i i i ic w r l z y
β
β= + − + − , (11b) 
if it is vertically integrated.  
 If firm i outsources, the price qi of the intermediate is determined via the 
maximisation of the following Nash bargain: 
       δδ −−−= 1])[(])[( iii
m
ii ycpyrqN     (i=1,2),  (12) 
where [0,1]δ ∈  is the bargaining power parameter. The larger is δ  the greater is the 
bargaining power of the upstream firm.   Bargaining between firms occurs at the same 
time as bargaining with unions and takes the level of investment as given; this yields:  
 i
m
i
ii
im
ii yrqy
yrq δ
δ
δ
δ
−
+=
∂∂−
−=
22
3
/2
. (13) 
                                                 
18 This result is akin to that obtained, in a different framework, by Skaksen and Sörensen (2001) and 
Lommerud et al (2009). The role of complementarities between workers’ tasks in determining the 
benefits to workers from fragmentation of production was first highlighted by Horn and Wolinsky (1998).  
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Clearly, the price of the intermediate is ceteris paribus increasing in the bargaining 
power of the upstream firm and in the output of the downstream firm.  
3.3  Stage 2 
The firms choose their investment levels simultaneously in stage 2. If the intermediate is 
produced in-house, then Ki is chosen to maximise operating profits net of the investment 
cost, i.e. 2 2Vi i i iK y zπ − = − . Note that )( Vicp −  and iK  have been eliminated using (5) 
and 2ii zK = . We can model the firm as choosing the level of cost reduction (zi), which 
simplifies the algebra somewhat. The resulting first-order condition is: 
 02 =⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
− i
i
i
i zdz
dyy , (14) 
which implies: ( )iiiViVi dzdyyKz == .  It will prove convenient to write this as:   
 i
VkV
i
V
i yKz θ== ,   where k=(V,O). (15) 
The first superscript in Vkθ  refers to the mode-of-operation of firm i, while the second 
one refers to the mode-of-operation of its rival. The expression for Vkθ differs depending 
on the mode-of-operation chosen by the rival firm.  The expressions for Vkθ  in the 
different regimes are reported in Section I of the Appendix.  
 The θ parameters can be thought of as measures of investment-to-output ratios, 
with the ‘aggressiveness’ in investment increasing in θ. As shown in Section II of the 
Appendix, VVθ > VOθ  holds for any value of β and δ. This means that outsourcing by its 
rival tends to reduce firm i’s investment-to-output ratio. Thus, outsourcing by one firm 
softens the behaviour of its rival, i.e. it reduces the latter’s aggressiveness in investment. 
This results in a ‘strategic motive’ to outsource which is explored in more depth in 
Leahy and Montagna (2007).  
 If the intermediate is outsourced, then zi is chosen to maximise the supplier’s 
operating profit net of the investment cost; this is given by: 2 232 2i i iy zδδμ −= − , where we 
have made use of the fact that i
m
ii yrq δδ−=− 223)(  from (13) and we have eliminated iK  
using 2ii zK = .  At the optimum: )(223 iii
O
i dzdyyz δδ−= . This expression for optimal 
investment is obviously similar to that in which firm i is vertically integrated. It differs 
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only in that the right-hand side is now multiplied by (3/2)[δ/(2 – δ)]. We can write it in 
compact form as:   
 i
OkO
i
O
i yKz θ== ,   where k=(V,O). (16) 
The expression for Okθ  depends on the mode-of-operation chosen by the rival firm.  As 
shown in Section II of the Appendix, OVθ > OOθ  holds for any value of β and δ. This 
means that outsourcing by a firm tends to reduce the other firm’s investment-to-output 
ratio. So, as before, outsourcing by one firm ‘softens’ the behaviour of its rival, i.e. it 
reduces the latter’s aggressiveness in investment. 
 Investment reduces the marginal costs of final good production – and these 
marginal cost reductions generate rents. For β>0 and δ<1, under both modes-of-
operation, the investing agent (i.e. the final good producer under vertical integration or 
the upstream supplier under outsourcing) will appropriate only a share of these rents. 
Under vertical integration, the investor shares rents with the unions while, in the 
outsourcing case, the investor shares rents with the downstream firm.  These 
considerations have implications for the aggressiveness of investment, as reflected in 
the magnitude of the θ  parameters. It will be the case for all but very high values of 
both β and δ that VV OVθ θ>  and VO OOθ θ> , i.e. the investment-to-output ratio is higher 
under vertical integration than under outsourcing (this is proved in Section III of the 
Appendix).  The intuition for this rests on a key difference between the two modes-of-
operation regimes, that is: under outsourcing the effectiveness of investment in reducing 
the marginal cost of producing the final good is lower than under vertical integration. 
This is because, as the marginal cost falls (and output increases), both the price of the 
intermediate (q) and the wage (w) rise endogenously under outsourcing, while only the 
wage rises under vertical integration.   Note, however, that for sufficiently high 
bargaining powers of both the union and the supplier (as proved in Section III of the 
Appendix), the investment-to-output ratio is lower under vertical integration than under 
outsourcing (i.e. VV OVθ θ<  and VO OOθ θ< ). The intuition for this reversal is that, in this 
instance, the vertically integrated firm must share the rents from investment with the 
unions to a greater extent, thus having a lower incentive to invest; however, at the same 
time, under outsourcing the upstream firm retains a greater share of the returns from 
investment. The fact that in this case the investment-to-output ratio is lower under 
vertical integration than under outsourcing would seem to suggest that by contracting 
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out the development of the intermediate a firm might obtain a lower marginal cost of 
producing the final good, due to the higher input quality resulting from the higher 
investment under outsourcing. However, this is not the end of the story, because under 
outsourcing the final good firm is now suffering from the effects of rent extracting 
behaviour of two parties rather than one: the unions (on the remaining level of 
employment) and the upstream supplier. Hence, even when unions are very strong, the 
marginal cost under outsourcing may still be higher than under vertical integration – 
despite a higher investment-to-output ratio.19   
 
3.4  Stage 1 
The firms simultaneously choose their mode-of-operation in stage 1 of the game.  To 
establish whether a firm will outsource or choose to be vertically integrated, we must 
compare its profits under the two regimes for a given behaviour of its rival. To this end, 
it proves useful to obtain expression for the profits in terms of outputs and parameters 
only. Substituting from the first-order conditions for output in (5) and the expressions 
for optimal investment in (15) into (3a), we can rewrite the profit function under vertical 
integration as: 
 2 2( ) 1 ( )Vk Vk Vki iy Gπ θ⎡ ⎤= − −⎣ ⎦ , where k=(V,O).                                                 (17) 
Using (5) in (3b), the profit function under outsourcing can be rewritten similarly as:   
 2)( Oki
Ok
i y=π ,   where k=(V,O).          (18) 
It is immediately obvious from (17) and (18) that a sufficient condition for VkOk ππ >  is 
that VkOk yy ≥  . The term in square bracket is less than unity and so if outsourcing 
results in an increase in output then it dominates vertical integration.   
 
3.5 Effects of the mode-of-operation on wages and union rents 
Before proceeding to analyse the mode-of-operation equilibria in the following section, 
it is useful to expand on the implications of firms’ mode-of-operation for wages and 
union rents.  
                                                 
19 Clearly, the difference between the marginal costs in the two regimes will also depend on the 
underlying differences between downstream and upstream firms’ costs as determined by technology 
and/or factor prices.  
 14
 It is straightforward to show that the greater is a firm’s profitability, the higher is 
the total rent that its union can extract. Therefore, if a change in its mode-of-operation 
increases the downstream firm’s operating profits, then this will lead to higher total 
union rents.  To see this, note that equation (10) implies that ihi
h
i yww β
βξ
−
=− 22
3)( , from 
which it follows that hi
h
i
h
i Lww πβ
β ~)( 223 −=− , since substitution from (5) into the 
operating profits yields ( )2~ hihi y=π .  Perhaps surprisingly, however, this does not mean 
that a switch in the mode-of-operation that raises the downstream firm’s profitability 
also necessarily raises the union wage. This is because the union rents per unit of labour 
( )hiw w−  are proportional to 
h h
i i
h h
i i
y
L
π
ξ=

 which is the operating profit per unit of labour 
employed.  Hence, if output ( hiy ) were constant, then a change in the mode-of-operation 
that reduced the per unit labour requirement ( hiξ ) would raise the union wage.  
Outsourcing of the production of the intermediate would involve such a move and, as 
explained earlier, would lead to the union becoming more aggressive in its wage setting 
behaviour.  
4.  The Mode-of-operation Equilibria  
We turn now to a discussion of the mode-of-operation equilibria. Clearly, there are four 
possible candidate equilibrium regimes: (V,V), (V,O), (O,V), and (O,O), where the first 
letter refers to mode-of-operation selected by firm 1 and the second letter refers to the 
mode-of-operation of firm 2.   
 We begin in subsection 4.1 with what we will call the “base case”, in which the 
firms are ex-ante symmetric and furthermore there is no underlying cost advantage or 
disadvantage from outsourcing. The underlying cost advantage from outsourcing is 
captured by ˆ mi i iwr r tρ ≡ − −  (i=1,2) which is a measure of the difference between the 
marginal production cost of the intermediate for the vertically integrated firm and that 
for the upstream supplier.20  Hence in the base case, in the absences of an underlying 
cost advantage from outsourcing, 1 2 0ρ ρ= = .   In subsection 4.2, we relax the 
assumption that 0=iρ , in particular to consider the effects of trade liberalisation 
                                                 
20  The underlying (ex-ante) cost advantage from outsourcing depends only on exogenous parameters. 
There will of course be an ex-post cost difference between firms which will depend on endogenous 
variables such as w and q among other things.  
 15
(captured by reductions in t). We also wish to analyse the effect of cost asymmetries 
between the firms. This is done in subsection 4.3 where we allow for changes in 
( )12 ˆˆ rrw −≡φ , where the parameter φ can be thought of as the pre-investment cost 
advantage of firm 1 under vertical integration.21  
 
4.1  The base case   
When firms are ex-ante symmetric and there is no underlying cost advantage from 
outsourcing, it can be shown (see Section V of the Appendix) that the ex-post (i.e. 
equilibrium) marginal cost is higher under outsourcing than under vertical integration.  
This result is robust to different values of the bargaining power parameters β and δ, 
even when, for values of both β and δ close to one, the investment-to-output ratio is 
higher under outsourcing than under vertical integration – a situation which, as we 
explained in Section 3, arises from the countervailing effects of the double source of 
rent-extraction (from both the union and the upstream supplier) in the case of 
outsourcing, as against the single source of rent extraction (the union) under vertical 
integration.   
 In the base case, it can be shown that the pattern of equilibria depends on the level 
of governance cost, G.  If G is sufficiently large, then both firms will choose to 
outsource (O,O). At G=0, both firms are vertically integrated and (V,V) is the unique 
subgame perfect equilibrium. At intermediate levels of G, there is multiple asymmetric 
equilibria (V,O) and (O,V).  Further details are provided in Section VI of the Appendix. 
 The emergence of asymmetric equilibria can be explained by the existence of a 
negative interdependence between the firms’ mode-of-operation decisions. As we 
showed, due to the greater aggressiveness of domestic unions in the presence of 
outsourcing as well as to the additional rent extracting activity of the upstream firm, 
outsourcing is a higher marginal cost (in exchange for lower fixed cost) – and hence a 
lower output – strategy.  As a result, outsourcing can be seen as a less aggressive 
business strategy than vertical integration. The relative incentive to choose vertical 
integration is larger the larger is a firm’s expected output – because the lower marginal 
production cost then applies to a larger output. Faced with lower marginal cost 
                                                 
21 Pre-investment cost differences between the firms could also result from asymmetries in the cost of 
serving the final good markets – e.g. in the instance in which one firm may be further away from the final 
good market than the other. Similarly, the effect of differential protectionist policies (should the firms be 
located in different countries) could also be incorporated into φ. 
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vertically integrated rivals, a firm will then have a lower anticipated market share and 
hence a lower incentive to vertically integrate than a firm that faces an outsourced rival. 
However, a firm facing an outsourcing (higher marginal cost) rival, will have a greater 
incentive to vertically integrate because it has a higher anticipated output (and hence 
will benefit more from a lower marginal production cost). Over a range of G, 
outsourcing is a best response to a rival’s vertical integration but vertical integration is a 
best response to a rival’s outsourcing.  This result is analogous to that obtained in Leahy 
and Montagna (2009a,b) in a model without unions and with an endogenous choice of 
the mode of internationalisation. It is thus clear that the economizing and strategizing 
dimensions are entwined in determining the mode-of-operation decision of firms.22   
 It can be shown that whilst the order of equilibrium regions with respect to G is 
invariant to changes in the value of the bargaining power of unions (β) and of the 
upstream supplier (δ), the range of G over which outsourcing occurs in equilibrium 
increases in β and falls in δ.  The effect of β is consistent with the conventional wisdom 
that strong union power may encourage outsourcing as a ‘means-to-escape-unions’ 
behaviour – even though this may result in higher wages for the workers who remain in 
domestic employment. As for the bargaining power of the supplier, a higher δ clearly 
reduces the share of rents available to the downstream firm under outsourcing and hence 
ceteris paribus increases incentives to vertically integrate.   
 
4.2  Cost advantages of outsourcing and trade liberalisation 
In this subsection, we again assume that the downstream firms are ex-ante symmetric 
and their prospective upstream partners are also ex-ante symmetric but we allow for the 
upstream and downstream firms to differ in their underlying costs, i.e. we allow for 
ˆ 0mi i iwr r tρ ≡ − − ≠ . This difference, which could arise from local differences in factor 
prices and/or technology, may also be affected by changes in trade costs t, with ρ 
increasing as t falls.  Since we maintain the symmetry across firms at the same level in 
the production chain, 21 ρρρ == .  The ranking of equilibria with respect to the 
governance costs of vertical integration are the same regardless of ρ, the underlying cost 
advantage of the upstream producers.  The resulting mode-of-operation regimes are 
illustrated in Figure 1 below.  In the figure, the downward sloping curves are 
                                                 
22 This aspect is analysed in more detail in Leahy and Montagna (2009b). 
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indifference loci for the firm, giving combinations of G and ρ at which the firm is 
indifferent between vertical integration and outsourcing given the mode of operation of 
its rival. Above a locus, given the mode-of-operation of its rival, a firm would choose to 
outsource, and below the locus it would prefer vertical integration. Along the lower 
locus ( VV OVi iπ π= ), firm i is indifferent between vertical integration and outsourcing 
when its rival is vertically integrated, while along the upper locus ( VO OOi iπ π= ), the firm 
is indifferent between the modes-of-operation when its rival outsources.   
 
 
It is clear from Figure 1 that trade liberalisation, by reducing the cost of importing the 
outsourced intermediate, increases the range of parameter values over which 
outsourcing is chosen. In the figure, trade liberalisation is captured by a rightwards 
movement at constant G (see the arrow representing the direction of increasing trade 
liberalisation). If G is sufficiently low, trade liberalisation moves us from (V,V) to the 
region of multiple equilibria (V,O) and (O,V), and then on to the region of  (O,O).23   
 
4.3  Cost asymmetries between downstream firms 
So far we have assumed that the final goods firms are ex ante symmetric. However, 
since there is ample empirical evidence documenting the importance of intra-industry 
                                                 
23 Qualitatively, the effects of changes in β and δ on the equilibrium regions are the same as those 
discussed in sub-section 4.1 above.  
G 
ρ
VO OO
i iπ π=  
VV OV
i iπ π=
(O,O) 
(V,O) (O,V) 
(V,V) 
Figure 1: Cost advantages of outsourcing and trade liberalisation 
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cost and technology differences between firms,24 it is interesting to examine the effects 
of underlying cost differences in firms for their propensity to outsource. 
 We find that, ceteris paribus, the higher cost firms are the ones that are more likely 
to choose to outsource. In Figure 2, where the first superscript in the labels of the 
indifference profit loci refers to firm 1 and the second refers to firm 2, we have set 
021 === ρρρ  (so that upstream firms have no cost advantage or disadvantage over 
downstream firms) and have allowed φ to increase: as this happens, the cost advantage 
of firm 1 over firm 2 gets larger.  
 
 
As is clear from the figure, the region of (V,O) in which the first firm is vertically 
integrated while the, now higher cost, second firm outsources gets larger in φ.  These 
results are consistent with the view emerging from our analysis that outsourcing 
represents a less aggressive business strategy than vertical integration.   
   
5.  Concluding Remarks  
We have used a unionised oligopoly model to examine how the strategic interaction 
between firms and between firms and unions determine the effects of unionisation on 
the incentive to outsource and the effect of outsourcing on investment and firms’ 
efficiency.   
                                                 
24 See for instance Bartelsman and Doms (2000) for a survey of evidence.   
G 
φ
1 1
VO OOπ π=  
2 2
VV VOπ π=  
(O,O) 
(V,O) 
(O,V) 
(V,V) 
Figure 2: Downstream cost asymmetries 
(V,O) 
(V,O) 
(V,O) 2 2
OV OOπ π=  
1 1
VV OVπ π=  
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We found that outsourcing can increase the aggressiveness of unions when not 
all unionised production tasks are outsourced. The reason for this is that the impact of 
domestic wages on a firm’s marginal cost is relatively less important when the firm 
outsources part of its production abroad, because reliance on domestic labour is lower. 
Thus, while an increase in the bargaining power of unions will typically result in more 
outsourcing (and this is consistent with the view that foreign procurement of 
intermediate inputs may be used as a means to escape powerful unions), an increase in 
outsourcing will – other things equal – increase the wage that firms will pay on the 
(remaining) domestically employed labour.  In addition to increasing the aggressiveness 
of domestic unions, outsourcing exposes the firm to a second hold-up problem due to its 
dependence on an upstream supplier. As a result, outsourcing is likely to lead to an 
increase in the marginal production cost of the downstream firm – even if there are 
substantial underlying cost advantages of the foreign supplier in producing the 
intermediate or when the investment-to-output ratios are higher under outsourcing than 
under vertical integration (as is the case for very high bargaining powers of unions and 
of the upstream supplier).  Thus, if marginal costs are higher under outsourcing, firms’ 
mode-of-operation choice involves a trade-off between this and the higher governance 
cost associated with vertical integration.   
We also showed that by reducing the relative cost of procuring intermediates 
abroad, trade liberalisation increases the degree of outsourcing.  Depending on the level 
of governance costs, it can change the equilibrium from one in which all firms vertically 
integrate, to an asymmetric one in which firms choose different modes-of-operation, to 
an equilibrium in which all firms outsource.  
Finally, we showed that asymmetric equilibria (in which firms choose different 
modes-of-operation) emerge even when firms are ex-ante identical. In addition, in the 
presence of ex-ante cost asymmetries between firms, the relatively less productive firms 
are shown to be the ones that are more likely to choose to outsource and, in line with 
some of our earlier research, outsourcing could then be seen as a less aggressive 
business strategy than vertical integration.  
Our model suggests that labour market deregulation policies aimed at reducing 
unions’ power may result in less outsourcing and also in lower union wages. Our results 
provide a rationale for the stylised fact that, as highlighted in the introduction, 
outsourcing does not unambiguously lead to a reduction of a firm’s marginal costs. 
They also help to explain why – even within the same industry – technologically similar 
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firms adopt different modes-of-operation (for instance, in the highly oligopolistic 
aerospace industry, outsourcing though increasing at Airbus still lags behind that of its 
rival Boeing).  
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Appendix 
I. The parameter θ  in the different regimes 
From (15) and (16), it is clear that the optimal z is proportional to output.  So, it is 
possible to write the expression for investment in a general form as:   
 hki
hkhk
i yz θ= ,   (A1) 
where the first superscript refers to the mode-of-operation of firm i and the second 
refers to the mode-of-operation of its rival.  The parameter θ  takes on a different value 
depending on the mode-of-operation of the firm and that of its rival. When firm i is 
vertically integrated, we have i
Vk
i
Vk dzdy /=θ  for (k=V,O) and when firm i is 
outsourcing we get [ ] iOkiOk dzdy /)2/()2/3( δδθ −=  for (k=V,O).    
To obtain an expression for  ii dzdy / , differentiate (6) to get: 
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When firm i is vertically integrated, its marginal cost takes the form of (11b). 
Differentiation of (11b) with respect to zi yields: 
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When firm i is involved in outsourcing its marginal cost takes the form of (11a) with qi 
eliminated using (13). Differentiation of this with respect to zi yields: 
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OF    and  (k=V,O)              (A4) 
So, in general, we can write: )/(/ 23 i
hk
i
h
i
h
i dzdyFwdzdc +−=  for (h,k=V,O). Similarly, 
the general expression for the effect of zi on the rival firm’s costs is: 
)/(/ 2
3
i
hk
j
k
i
k
j dzdyFdzdc =  for (h,k=V,O).           
 
I.1 Firm i is vertically integrated  
To find Vkθ , we first need to find )/( iVki dzdy  for k=(V,O). Substitution of (A3) and the 
general expression for i
k
j dzdc /  into (A2) yields: 
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We also need an expression for i
Vk
j dzdy / . Adopting an approach analogous to that we 
used to derive (A5), it is straightforward to show that:  
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Combining (A5) and (A6) yields:  
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I.2 Firm i is outsourcing  
When firm i is outsourcing we need an expression for i
Ok
i dzdy / . To obtain such an 
expression use (A4) and the general expression for i
h
i dzdc / in (A2) to get: 
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This is clearly analogous to (A5) with O replacing V in the expression. So, following 
the same procedure as before, combine this with: 
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3
δ
δθ        for k=(V,O). (A9)  
 
II. Outsourcing by a firm lowers the investment-to-output ratios of its rival 
Demonstrating that VVθ > VOθ  and OVθ > OOθ  hold for all values of β and δ is 
straightforward. Use (A7) to get an expression for ( VVθ – VOθ ). It is convenient to 
simplify the notation and write:  SRVVw /1 =θ  where VFR 2132 += and 
2
4
3 )(21 VV FFS ++= . Similarly, using this notation, we can write: 
 23
)]1(/[][ 43211
VVO
w FDSDR +++=θ , where δδ−= 2D . Then:    
 ( )
)]1([
)1(
4
3
2
1
4
3
1
V
V
VOVV
w FDSS
SFR
D
++
−+
=−θθ      (A10) 
The denominator of (A10) and the parameter D are clearly positive and the numerator 
reduces to 0))(()1)(()1( 61
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(A9), analogous calculations can be used to demonstrate that ( )OOOVw θθ −1 >0. 
 
III. Investment-to-output ratios are lower under outsourcing except for high β and δ 
We need to compare Vkθ and Okθ .  As above, it is helpful to simplify the notation and 
write:  SRVkw ′′= /1 θ  where kFR 2132 +=′  and kVkV FFFFS 431' +++= . Similarly, we 
can write: )]1('/[)'( 4
3
2
31 kOk
w FDSDR ++=θ  where δδ−= 2D . Then:    
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The denominator of (A11) and the parameter R′ are clearly positive and the numerator is 
guaranteed to be positive for 32<D  or, equivalently, 54<δ . Even if δ =1, Vkθ  is still 
larger than Okθ  unless β is also very high. To see this, let δ =1. Then it follows that 
D=1, and the numerator becomes: )()( 83214121
kVk FFF +−+  which is positive if and 
only if: 
)1(
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FF
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+
< .  Since kF  cannot exceed 2 by definition, a value of VF  close 
to unity – and thus a value of β close to unity – is required for  Okθ  to exceed Vkθ .  But 
note that if both β and δ  are unity, then VF =1 but 1)1/()1( 4321 <++ kk FF  and so in 
that interesting case: Okθ > Vkθ . 
 
IV. Reduced form equilibrium output expressions in the different regimes. 
Combining (5) and (1), the first-order condition for output of a typical firm can be 
written in general form as:  
  02 =−−− ji
hk
i yyca     (i,j=1,2) and ( )ji ≠    h, k=(V,O)     (A12) 
where hkic is the marginal cost for firm i when it chooses mode-of-operation h=(V,O) 
and its rival chooses mode-of-operation k=(V,O). From the expression for the wage in 
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(10), the labour component of firm i’s marginal cost is: i
h
i
h
i
h
i yww β
βξξ
−
+= 22
3  and 
from (13) the intermediate good’s price it must pay under outsourcing is: 
i
m
ii yrq δδ−+= 223 . Both of these depend on the firms’ outputs. Making use of these 
relationships and the expression for investment in (A1), we can rewrite the first-order 
condition for firm i in general form as 
 02 =+−− i
hk
ji
h
i yyyA η       (i,j=1,2) and ( )ji ≠    h, k=(V,O)     (A13) 
where VVkVk Fw 23−≡ θη  and OOkOk Fw 23−≡ θη , with the first superscript referring 
to the mode-of-operation (V,O) of firm i and the second superscript to that of its rival. 
The parameters ( )lrwaA iVi +−= ˆ  and ( )tlwraA miOi ++−=  only depend on the firm’s 
own mode-of-operation. It is useful to use trrw miii −−= ˆρ  (i=1,2) and ( )12 ˆˆ rrw −≡φ  to 
write: 111 ρ+= VO AA  , φ−= VV AA 12  and 212 ρφ +−= VO AA .   
From the equations for firm i an j in (A13), we can obtain the reduced form equilibrium 
output expressions for the two firms: 
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The reduced form expression for industry output is thus:  
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V. Demonstrating that in the base case that marginal costs are higher under 
outsourcing than vertical integration 
In the base case, kj
h
i AA =  and hence industry output reduces to 
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)2( . It is straightforward to show that this is increasing in 
hkη  and khη  for all values of η  consistent with stable interior solutions. Since VVη > 
VOη > OVη > OOη  , it follows that OOOVVOVV yyyy >=>  regardless of the level of β and 
δ.  Now, using (6) we find that: { })()( 221131 hkrshkrsrshk ccccyy −+−=−  for (h,k= V,O) and 
(r,s=V,O). It is then easy to show that: ( )VOVOVVVV cccc 2121 22 +<= OOOO cc 21 22 =< (here 
the first superscript refers to firm 1 and the second to firm 2). Combining this with the 
fact that VOVO cc 21 < , it then follows that 
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(for i=1,2). Hence, ex-post equilibrium marginal costs in the base case are higher under 
outsourcing than under vertical integration. 
 
VI. Equilibria in the fully symmetric base case 
In the base case, the firms are ex ante symmetric and there is no underlying cost 
advantage from outsourcing. In that case, both firms choosing to vertically integrate is 
the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium at G=0.  Using (17) and (18), it is clear 
that this requires that:  
 [ ] 222 )()(1)( OkiVkVki yy >− θ     (i,j=1,2) and ( )ji ≠     k=(V,O)      (A16)                                
Taking the square root of both sides and making use of the reduced form expressions for 
output in (A14), this condition becomes: 
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where AAAAA Oj
O
i
V
j
V
i ====  as 0=== φρρ ji  in the base case. It can be shown that 
the condition in (A17) holds for all parameters consistent with stable interior solutions 
in all equilibria. It can also be shown that in the base case the difference in (A17) is 
strictly larger when the rival firm outsources.  Hence, at any given G, the gain in profit 
from vertical integration relative to outsourcing is larger when the rival is outsourcing.  
Thus, there exists a non empty set of G such that: 
 [ ] [ ] 0)()(1)(   )()(1)( 222222 >−−>>−− OViVVVViOOiVOVOi yyGyy θθ   (i,j=1,2)      (A18) 
For levels of G within this range, a firm will find it more profitable to be vertically 
integrated if its rival is outsourcing, but more profitable to be outsourcing if its rival is 
vertically integrated. Hence, for this region of G there are multiple asymmetric 
equilibria (VO) and (OV). Clearly, for [ ]   )()(1)( 222 OOiVOVOi yyG −−> θ , firms will 
always wish to outsource; hence (OO) is the unique equilibrium. 
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